

A SHORT
VINDICATION
OF THE
PASSAGES in the ESSAY
TOWARDS AN
ANSWER
TO THE
ESSAY on SPIRIT,

As Remark'd on by the AUTHOR of
that ESSAY.

BY THE
Rev. THOMAS M'DONNELL, D.D.

Ecce
Crispinus minimo me provocat. HOR. lib. i. Sat. 45

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A SHORT
VINDICATION, &c.

THE Passages remarked on by the Author of the *Essay on Spirit*, being singled out, by him, as the most notorious, and most remarkably exceptionable; I am the more readily induced to undertake their Vindication, as well because the Manner, in which that Gentleman treateth them, hath made the Business very easy, as because I am inclined to hope, that, if he should be set right with regard to these, he might be led to think more favourably of the Whole.

What I have said then with regard to this Gentleman's entering into the Service of the Church, is, I believe, not even, as much as might be fairly deduced from the Account, which he gives of himself. In the first Paragraph of his Dedication, he hath these Words, ' Into which (Eccle-

“ sialtical Preferment) before I *Could* be
 “ admitted, I was *Obliged* to subscribe
 “ the four first *Canons*, &c.’ Which man-
 ner of Expression, in my humble Appre-
 hension, implies a sort of Force reluctant-
 ly complied with. But now he is pleased
 to tell us, that he hath, already, acknow-
 ledged that he was bred up in a thorough
 Perswasion of the *Orthodoxy* of the Church
 of *Ireland*; but where he hath said
 this, I do not remember; and if he
 had, it should seem not at all consistent
 with saying, that he was *Obliged* to
 subscribe. But in Answer to this he will
 perhaps say, every one, who subscribes,
 lays himself under an Obligation, and is
 consequently obliged; but this sort of
 Obligation is in Consequence of the Sub-
 scription, and not this a Consequence of
 that; so that his saying he was *Obliged*
 to subscribe, implies a Force prior to that,
 which actual Subscription, reasonably,
 brought upon him. To reconcile then
 these Inconsistencies, he must, either, ac-
 knowledge the utter Impropriety of his
 former manner of Expression, and con-
 sequently that I have given it, in the
 Words remarked upon by him, a milder
 Sense than it even could naturally bear,
 or confess that he was not so *tho-*
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roughly perfwaded, as he now pretends to say he was.

But fuppose his manner of Exprefion, as proper, as he would have it to be ; yet fure he gives us to underftand as plainly as words can, that not till after he was admitted, &c. he found Leifure to apply fome time to his Books, and to *Think*, as well as to *Read* : For tho' he doth not fay in exprefs Terms, ' after his Admiffion,' yet he plainly introduces it as a Fact consequential of his Admiffion. And tho' his Words may be brought to mean, that he *Read* before ; yet the *Emphatical* Diftinction, which he makes between *Reading* and *Thinking*, feems plainly to confine the Commencement of his *Thinking* to the Period of Time after his Preferment. What, therefore, this Gentleman fays of himfelf is fufficient Grounds for my faying, that it was pretty plain, (and not, barely, plain, as he cites it,) that he took not effectual Pains, which is equal to taking no Pains at all, to inform his Mind until fome time after he was in Orders. And notwithstanding the implied Imputation in his Queftion, I fhall think myfelf clear, either of Difhonefty, or want of Charity, tho' I fay, that every Man, who, upon

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changing his Opinion, makes the like Declaration, never took *Effectual* Pains to inform himself *thoroughly* before. Whether he hath done himself Justice in his own Account he best knows ; but from his own Words he is judged.

But again this Gentleman asks, ‘ must every one who writes with a shew of Benevolence, be void of Conscience, and write only from the Dictates of Vanity ?’ to which I answer, that I do not barely say, a *Shew* of Benevolence, but an *affected Shew* ; and Affectation always implies a real want of what is, thereby, only pretended : But Pretences of all Kinds are insincere, and where Sincerity is wanting, Conscience is little concerned. To pretend a cautious Regard for the Quiet of Men’s Minds, at the same Time, that we are endeavouring, all in our Power, to disturb and perplex them, may carry an affected shew of Benevolence, but little or none of real Good-will and affection to our Fellow-Creatures. If then it be not Humanity, nay, the highest Christianity to expose such Designs, I leave to every sincere Christian to determine.

His

His Remark, upon the extraordinary Proposition, as he is pleased to call it, Page the 6th of my Dedication, carries in it so weak and low a Sneer, that I shall pass it by with the Contempt it deserves. The Proposition itself, as it stands connected with the Sense of the Passage, to which it belongs, will, I doubt not, appear to all reasonable Men to be just, weighty and pertinent ; especially as it is directly opposed to an Insinuation of this Gentleman's, (Page the 6th of his Ded.) Wherein he seems to assert, that not any *two thinking Men* ever agreed exactly in their Opinion with regard to any one of the Articles of our Religion ; many of which, however, are the direct and express Doctrines of the Scriptures themselves, and which he now, in his Remark, contrary to his former Assertion, seems plainly to admit.

In his Remark upon my Words, p. 17. he in the first Place, strangely misrepresents their Application ; for whoever will take the Pains to compare both our Dedications, will find, that what I say refers to p. 21. Octavo Edit. of his, and not to the 40, &c. Pages, as he represents it ; where (p. 21.) putting the Church and

the State upon the same Footing, he plainly insinuates the Church to be no more infallible than the State in any respect whatsoever. To obviate this, I assert and shew, in, perhaps, too general Expressions, their Difference, and wherein it consists; to wit, the fundamental Laws of each: Which with regard to the Church, being the fixed and unalterable Laws of God, the Church, in that respect, must be looked upon to be more perfect than the State, and consequently less fallible; the Rule of its Judgment and Action being certain and infallible, that of the State precarious and fallible. Now, as to the force, which he, in the second Place, is pleased to give my Argument, tho' it may be collected from the Words, that I say the Laws of the Church are the Laws of God; yet by no manner of Inference can it be shewn, that I affirm, that the Laws of the Church, when once established, become the Laws of God, which, as I apprehend, makes a wide Difference. For in that Paragraph I take upon me to shew, that the Laws of our Church must appear to all wise and unprejudiced Men to be the direct and plain dictates of the holy Scriptures; and if so, they must then be also the Laws of God, who hath declared his Will to us in those

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Sacred Writings, the course of the Proof tending to shew, that they cannot be, morally, supposed to contain, fundamentally, either more or less than what his Will and Word declare. They therefore become the Laws of the Church, because it appears that they are the Will or Laws of God; and not become the Laws of God, because they are established by human Appointment, as the Laws of the Church, independently of their being the Will of God; which is the Sense, this Gentleman, without any Grounds, puts upon my Words. Now I believe no reasonable Man will deny, that the Laws of any Church, which thus appear to be the Laws of God, are fixed and unalterable; and yet this Assertion, which is evidently true, is by no means inconsistent with allowing, that the Decisions, of such a Church, may be examined and disputed, till it appears that they are entirely consonant to the will of God, upon which it is founded; as therefore the Case of a Church to established, must, as to its fundamental Laws, be very different from the Case of the State; so the allowed right of examining its Decrees, renders it altogether different from the Church of *Rome*, with regard to the pretended absolute Infallibility of that Church. When

therefore, I say, the Laws of the Church are the Laws of God, I cannot be understood to mean, as this Gentleman would insinuate, the Laws, which that Church, composed of fallible Members, meerly upon its own Authority, hath made, but the Laws plainly appointed, by the Will and Word of God, for the infallible Rule of its Faith and Practice.

Thus then, notwithstanding this Gentleman's forced Interpretation, his Answerer hopes, he will yet be allowed, by all candid and unprejudiced Readers, to be consistent with himself; and further presumes to believe, that it is now pretty well known, whether the Author of the *Essay on Spirit*, reasonably, finds fault with, what he calls, the *Athanasian* Doctrine of the Trinity; and whether he hath not run into the very same fault, which yet he blames others for? Is not the *Essay on Spirit* intended to be, as full an Explanation of the Doctrine of the Trinity, as any other Attempt that way whatsoever? Nay, has it not proceeded so far as, to endeavour to explain it quite away, and introduce, in its stead, what, neither, Reason, or Scripture give him the least Warrant for? The Doctrine of the Trinity, as revealed in the Scriptures, Christ and his Apostles, either directly declare, or plainly give us
to

to understand, to be a Myſtery. Chriſt declares the Father and himſelf to be one : St. *John* declares the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in the very ſame manner of Expreſſion, to be one. The Son is ſtyled God, in the ſtrongeſt Terms ; the Holy Spirit is implied to be God, in the ſtrongeſt Senſe. The Scriptures however enjoin us to believe in but one God, and declare, that there is but one God. Theſe three Perſons, therefore, muſt be the one God ; otherwiſe the Scriptures contradict themſelves. Divine Worſhip, moreover, is allowed, by the Scriptures, to be paid to the Son ; here then the ſame Worſhip, which is paid to the Father, is given to the Son : Two of the divine Perſons then are allowedly worſhipped. But theſe three Perſons are the one God ; the third Perſon therefore is entitled to the ſame Worſhip, as partaking, as fully and eſſentially, of the Godhead, as the other two. Theſe are the plain Doctrines of Scripture, or ſuch as are directly deducible from it. Now, hath *Atbanafius* ſaid any more than this ? hath he attempted to tell us, *how* theſe three Perſons are one God ? hath he attempted to explain the Myſtery in any one Particular ? not in the leaſt : He hath only collected and diſpoſed, in a continued ſeries of Propoſitions,

sitions, the several doctrinal Parts of this Article, as they lie scattered in the Body of the Scriptures, illustrated and enforced with Instances drawn from the same Authority. How far the Author of the *Essay* may extend the Professions of his Faith, I cannot tell; but this I am sure, he hath already declared his Disbelief of what the Scriptures plainly declare: To instance no more, the plain and express Doctrine of the Unity of God; and tho' every reasonable Man hath the Right he contends for, yet, I am afraid, when he thus runs Counter to the Scriptures themselves, no reasonable Satisfaction can be expected from any Use which he may make of it.

My incontestable Maxim, however ridiculously represented, seems notwithstanding, to have been Proof against any serious Attack; while the Hurry he was in, to give this fine Stroke of Humour, hath caused him to leave an unguarded Open, which I cannot help taking the Advantage of. For certainly, if it be true, that an Heretick is he, who opposes the true Faith, an Heretick cannot possibly be in the Right. Ay, but still he will ask, which is the true Faith? To which I can

can only answer; that seems to bid fairest for it, which the wisest and best Men, from the very first Ages of Christianity even to this Day, have profess'd, maintained and defended; while the contrary Faiths, from the Time of their first being broached, have had, for their Patrons, Men confessedly inferior, to their Adversaries, in Wisdom, or Honesty, or both; and who, only now and then, just as their Intrigues, or Artifices prevailed, have been espoused by Power, or supported by Faction.

Whether the Author of the *Essay on Spirit* hath taken every one of the Steps prescribed, he best knows; but, surely, every understanding Person who reads his Book, cannot help thinking, that he hath not so impartially examined the Scriptures as he pretends; and if his Reasons, when communicated, had been approved, how comes it to pass that, now they are published, the Publick Sense of them should be so different, from that of those many honest and able Men, who, as he would have us to suppose, privately approved them. But that he hath not communicated them in the requisite Manner, our admitted Account of his Proceeding,

ing, (p. 37, 38. Ded. *Essay towards an Answer, &c.*) affords but too strong a Presumption. No Body, I believe, will dispute his Stock of Insensibility; but his over-earnestness to shew it in the Light he would have us to take it, will be thought, I fear, to have led him, unwittingly, to betray what, otherwise, he, industriously, meant to conceal; at the same time that it strengthens our Suspicions of the Reception, which his Reasons might have met with, in any Shape.

But not satisfied with what he hath already misrepresented, he, again, says, that I take for granted, that our religious Establishment, &c. p. 34. Ded. but any one else, who hath considered the foregoing Paragraphs, will see, that I have frequently enforced, and indeed proved, the highest Probability of our Church's being free, at this time of Day, from any fundamental Error. What, therefore, I now assert is only the Result, or Conclusion, of what was before advanced; and consequently no Assumption of the Question in Debate. As to the Propriety of the Word, 'Provided,' if he will condescend to point out a more proper one, it shall be duly regarded. But if it be
not

not sufficient to prove the moral Certainty of the Soundness of our Religious Establishment, that truly wise and honest Men, conducted by a plain and infallible Rule, were concerned in the examining, reforming and settling it ; let him then tell us, where we are likely to end, or what Assurance we can have of the requisite Certainty in this, or in any other Matter of Moment of the like Nature ?

What I say with regard to the *Athanasian Creed*, p. 41. Ded. will, perhaps, be found not to afford such Matter of Triumph, as this Gentleman thinks. For, first, as to his Remark upon my saying that there is no more Connexion, between the Doctrine of that Creed and its Illustration, than between a Text and a Sermon that explains and illustrates it ; which yet, by no Means, amounts to an absolute Denial of any Sort of Connexion at all ; a candid Reader will perceive, that I plainly assert, that the Sermon doth explain and illustrate the Text, in which Respect there must be a close Connexion ; and not that it only *pretends* to do so ; which yet he is pleased to add, thereby to make out his Observation. But that the Sermon hath the same Grounds of Faith

Faith with the Text itself; will not, I believe, be said: The Matter of the Sermon, therefore, must be a distinct, disputable, Matter, to which we are at Liberty to give, or withhold our Assent, according to the Merits of it. But the Text is indisputably true, and its Truth independent of the Sermon, that explains it; and, consequently, in this Respect, not at all connected with it. This latter Sense then, I presume, my Words will fairly bear; especially as it corresponds with Mr. *Wheatley's*, whose Authority I should be very sorry to abuse, and to be ranked with whom, I confess myself greatly honoured. Now since all Manner of Connexion between a Sermon and its Text is not excluded by my Words, so neither is all manner of Connexion excluded, between the Illustration of the Doctrine of the Creed in Question, and the Doctrine itself; for tho' I say the Assent given to this Creed is only to the Doctrine, &c. Yet from the Nature of the Comparison, supplied me, by Mr. *Wheatley*, to explain my Meaning, it is plain, that I do not absolutely deny any Assent at all to be given to the Illustration; but that as a Sermon proportionably requires our Assent, so far as it appears truly to express the Doctrine
of

of its Text, so the Illustration, in the Creed, so far also requires our Assent, as it appears, justly and properly to illustrate its Doctrine: An absolute and unlimited Assent is given only to the Doctrine, a conditional and limited to the Illustration.

This Distinction then, necessarily arising from the Nature of the Things compared, must be allowed to be, at least implied in my Words; and that it is sufficiently implied in the Creed itself, what this Gentleman further remarks upon this Passage obliges me now to shew.

This Creed then begins with declaring the Necessity of keeping the Catholick Faith *whole* and undefiled: Where observe, first that the Expression; "to keep this Faith whole," and, "to keep this whole Faith," are very different; the last however is plainly the Sense, which this Gentleman chuses, when he infers from it, that the *whole* Creed is here particularly specified; but then, in the next Place, had he looked into the Original *Greek*, he could not possibly, if he understands that Language at all, have made

made such a Choice ; the original Word, *ΥΠΗ*, never, in all its various proper Acceptations, meaning what he, directly, makes to be the peculiar Sense of it here ; and consequently the Stress, he lays upon it to shew, that every the smallest Article, of this whole Creed itself, was absolutely here required, in the Words of the second Proposition, to be believed under Pain of perishing everlastingly, loses its main Prop, and his whole Argument manifestly totters. But to overthrow it entirely, it will be necessary further to observe, that in the nineteenth Proposition, in confirmation of the Equality of the Persons, asserted in the foregoing Illustrations, respecting the several divine Attributes, summed up in the comprehensive Terms of *God* and *Lord*, the Creed appeals to the Christian *Verity*, that is, the Scriptures which contain the whole Christian Faith : And Prop. 20th, in like Confirmation of their Unity, refers to the same Scriptures, plainly intimated by the Catholick Religion, the Rule and Foundation of which the Scriptures are ; which Appeal and Reference are to be understood also in each Illustration following, with regard to the Reservation of the respective Properties peculiar to each Person ;

son; the 27th Proposition plainly intimating as much, when it says, ‘ so that in all things, (Gr. ΔΙΑ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ) as is afore-
 ‘ said, &c. that is, so that in all these Instances and Illustrations, it appears, by
 ‘ comparing them with the Scriptures, that as we have before said, Prop. 3.
 ‘ the Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity, is to be worshipped; and then,
 ‘ Proposition 28th, concludes, He therefore that will be saved, must *thus* think
 ‘ of the Trinity,’ that is, he must unavoidably, upon comparing these Illustrations with the plain Doctrine of the Scriptures, think of the Trinity in a Manner agreeable to them. Which Appeal therefore plainly implies, no more than a Conditional Assent, and by parity of Reason, is to be understood, in the same Manner, as to the remaining Part of the Creed.

Doctor *Mac-Donnell* then, who acknowledges to read this Creed, *publicly* and solemnly, in the face of his Congregation, doth also, not *privately* but *publicly* declare, and is not ashamed of the Declaration, that the absolute Assent is given only to the Doctrine and not to the Illustration; while the Author of the *Essay on Spirit*, who we are to suppose, as *publicly*

lickly and solemnly, reads this Creed, doth yet, *privately* and covertly, whisper into our Ears, that no Manner of Assent ought to be given, either to Doctrine, or Illustration. Casuistry this is not ; for he doth not even aim at a Distinction. to reconcile his *No-Faith* and contrary Practise. Neither would so open and artless an Imputation, to another, of what he is most notoriously guilty of himself, give any one Reason to suspect him of being the least qualified for a Disciple of *Loyalas's*, if, in other Respects, his Pretensions were not to be disputed.

If a strong Contempt and an avowed Disapprobation of the *Essay on Spirit* be what its Author means by *Virulence*, I know of none of the *Bishops*, who then adorned that Bench, that expressed himself so strongly against it, as that confessedly learned and ingenious Prelate, the late Bishop of *Eloyne* : One, whom even this Gentleman allows to be a Person of great Name, and whose Letter, therefore, which I had the Honour to receive from him, upon my Application for Leave to lay my Labours before him, I shall take the Liberty to make publick, the rather, as it can in no Sort, appear to redound to my
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own Praise, or in the least injure the *Memory* of that great Man.

“ * *SIR,*

“ **T**HE Weakness and Presumption of
“ the Book stiled an *Essay on Spirit*,
“ render it undeserving of any serious
“ Answer. I find there are some anony-
“ mous Persons who have treated it in a
“ ludicrous Manner. But if you are
“ minded to confute it seriously, I make
“ no Doubt of your being singly an
“ Over-match for such an Adversary. I
“ shall therefore leave him to yourself,
“ and wishing you good Success remain,

Sir,

Your Faithful,

Cloyne, May

7, 1752.

Humble Servant,

G. CLOYNE.

* The Original lies in the Bookseller's Hands for
the Satisfaction of those who may desire to see it.

Gus

Chi non displicuisse Viro, non ultima Laus est.

For though he hath written, not only a Book, but Books ; yet they are such, as no Person, of common Sense, could wish, in the Bitterness of his Heart, his Enemy to write.*

Thus far then his Remarks on the Dedication appear to be either altogether groundless, or such, as a candid and unprejudiced Reader could never think of making.

His Remark, however, on the Words of the Book itself, p. 3. still breathes the same Candour and Ingenuity ; plainly misrepresenting and confounding their Sense by industriously throwing them into such a Light, as none but himself could devise. For surely when I say, ‘ It (*i. e.* the Term, Subsistence) implies not only Existence, but a dependent Existence, such as hath not its Cause within itself, but subsists and stands under something else, as its Cause and Support,’ any rea-

* The Words of *Job* are full as well apply’d upon another Occasion in an Answer to a small Pamphlet written some time ago upon the Subject of eating Blood.

sonable

sonable Man must perceive that, from the plain Connexion of the Sense, wherein it is clearly asserted that, it hath not its Cause within itself, the last Relative, 'It's,' refers to the governing Case to the Verb, 'subsists,' and not to the Expression, 'Something else;' which indeed would exhibit the Confusion of Ideas he asserts, could the Words with any Consistency bear his Sense. But now it must appear that the Confusion of Ideas is all his own, and he only is answerable for the absurd Consequences which he deduces from it.

In the same manner doth he misrepresent the Sense of my Words, p. 6. where it is evident, that I assert that it is 'unphilosophical to call every Thing that exists, &c. indifferently by the Names of, Being, Essence or Existence, Subsistence or Substance,' and not, as he says I do, 'to call every Being, Essence, or Existence, also by the Names of Subsistence, or Substance,' where he evidently confounds the Terms, Being, Essence, or Existence, with the Term, Subsistence or Substance; which yet I, as clearly, and constantly distinguish; shewing that, tho' a Subsistence is an Existence,

ence, yet every Thing that exists is not a Subsistence, which, besides that it exists, implies a dependent Existence ; and cannot therefore be understood, in any Sense, of every kind of Existence, such as, Being or Essence, which, it is shewn, properly and truly, means absolute and independent Existence. Neither do I allow, as this Gentleman again unfairly asserts, our Ignorance of the Existence of all Kind of Substances ; tho' I do that of their intimate Nature or Essence, p. 15. by which they do exist, and by the Properties flowing from which they are specifically distinguished ; and therefore it will not follow, tho' I again, p. 10. allow, ' that wherever we perceive any Properties, there must be Something, that is ' some Existence or other to support ' them,' that every Existence, of which we have any Ideas, must also be a Subsistence ; because it is already made clear, that we can conceive an Existence, which, besides supporting its Properties, hath its Cause within itself, and consequently absolutely independent ; which Independency we have proved utterly incompatible to the true and proper Notion of Subsistence ; and therefore that, God, for Instance, tho' he hath Properties, which, it is

is evident, is not the full Import of the Term, Subsistence, yet having his Cause within himself, which the same Term altogether excludes, cannot in any proper, or adequate, Sense of the Word, be so denominated.

I believe it will now be easy to determine at whose Door the Fault of misrepresenting lies, and whether any such general Charge of this Gentleman is to be credited, when he declines pointing out the Particulars: He best knows what he intended by his metaphysical *Garb*; but, as he hath not disputed my Account of it, (p. 37. Ded.) he seems fairly to give us leave to conclude it to be the real Matter of Fact. But to proceed.

When I deny, Sect. 29. his Assumption, that God may communicate Portions of his Attributes, he asks, how do I prove this? Why, says he, by shewing that God cannot divest himself of, or communicate, his Incommunicable Attributes (wherein he artfully endeavours to turn upon me the Absurdity, already but too justly, fixed upon himself *) amongst

* See the *Northern Creed*.

which, however, he plainly numbers his Omniscience and Omnipotence, and as plainly admits the Force of my Argument as to them ; while he is obliged to fly for Refuge to the stale Scholastic Distinction of incommunicable and communicable Attributes ; tho' the Words in his Essay manifestly extend to all, without the least Intimation of any such Distinction ; and then ranks, amongst the latter, what he before admitted to be of the Number of the former. As therefore the little Shew of Reasoning, he here exhibits, depends merely upon his taking, again, for granted, what he but just now gave up, so the bare pointing it out is sufficient to shew the Straits, into which he is driven, and the Hurry he is in to get out of them at any Rate.

In Answer to what he remarks on my 31st Sect. I would ask him, doth he not in his corresponding Section, suppose it probable, that some Spirits may be furnished with material Bodies, by the *Organical* Disposition of which they may be capable of receiving and communicating bodily Pain and bodily Pleasure, may have their Affections and Passions, as well as we? Now is not this making
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those Bodies of the same Kind, though of a much more delicate Texture than ours? and if so, where is the Dishonesty, or even Disingenuity, of arguing against him as I do? Indeed he puts it as if I made him give his Spirits as gross and as indelicate Bodies as our own: But whoever reads both Sections, must do me the Justice to say, that, I carry the Matter no farther than he warrants me; and, if any Fault is to be imputed, it is to himself, who insinuates, without any Grounds, that I assert his Angels to be composed of Flesh and Blood and Bones: Though I cannot help saying that, to prevent any gross Conceptions injurious to the Delicacy of his Meaning, he ought to have explained what he understood by an *Organical* Disposition of such Bodies, and his Spirits having, thereby, Affections and Passions as well as we.

What I mean by my Opinion of the *Septuagint* Translation, p. 53. I believe is obvious to every Man of common Sense; and the Author of the *Essay on Spirit* knows, in his Heart, that I insinuate nothing like what he Questions I do. God, he knows, permits, in an especial Manner, many Things to be done, which yet

he neither, immediately, conducts, or approves; and yet, that, by the wonderful Dispositions of his Providence, all Things tend to the Honour and Glory of his Name, as this Translation, of the Scriptures, into the *Greek* Tongue, manifestly did. The *Thistle*, therefore, which he is pleased to put into my Mouth, he found, I am afraid, a *File*, in his own; knowing it to be too true for him, that this Translation was not conducted by the unerring Spirit of God, as the Original was; though it was permitted by him, to be made by fallible Men, guided, meerly, by Human Skill and Knowledge, for Wise and Gracious Purposes.

Amongst the endless Confusion and numberless Contradictions of Argument, which, according to his wonted Candour, he asserts I make use of in speaking about Angels and Prophets sent by God; He, in great Tenderneſs, doubtless, to one of us, singles out only a few of the most remarkable Passages. The first is that of the Angel's appearing to *Hagar*, p. 94. where he says, that, the Interpretation, which I give the Angel's Words, is no more than what he contested for; which, if he is to be believed against himself,

self, is not true ; for he insists, that here-
in *Moses* calls this Angel, directly, *Jehovah*, which is what I deny, and mean,
by my Explanation, to obviate. But he
then says, that I make this Angel no more
than a meer Machine, a senseless and stu-
pid Bit of Matter, &c. in Confirmation
of which he produces my own Words,
plainly however introduced, by me, pre-
paratory, not only, to the clearing up of
this Passage, but of the several consequent
Appearances insisted on by him ; which,
had he compared them with what I declare
in the Beginning of the 70th Section, he
would have been equally convinced of, and
not have made so rash an Inference, in a
particular Case, from Words of so ge-
neral and extensive an Application.

But suppose the Words were calculat-
ed, meerly, for this single Case ; yet his
Consequence will by no means follow ;
for though I say ‘ that, therefore, any ex-
‘ traordinary Appearance, made use of
‘ by God to signify his immediate Pre-
‘ sence, is figuratively, called the Angel
‘ of his Presence, as that Mark or Indica-
‘ tion whereby his Presence is made
‘ known ;’ Yet this doth not preclude
me from supposing an intelligent Spirit

to be that Appearance; for as it is allowed that the true and proper Meaning of the Word Angel is Messenger, and, for that Reason, eminently, (*Καὶ ἔδοχον*, which is a plain Figure) and therefore, figuratively, given to the Messengers of God's Will; so my calling the Appearance of such a Messenger, figuratively, the Angel of God's Presence, is therefore neither at all improper, nor in any sort capable of this Gentleman's absurd Inference; and yet that an Angel, so called from the acknowledged Employment of such Spirits, may be sent without the significant Marks of God's immediate Presence, and therefore not the Angel of his Presence, is plain from what I have shewn, p. 105. from whence too it must follow, that, as the Angel of God's Presence never appears without some extraordinary Indication thereof, so that Indication may be signify'd without the Presence of such an intelligent Agent, as an Angel is generally understood to be; only where the Circumstances, of the Person to be addressed, render such an Angel's Presence necessary; as we have also more than intimated in the 106. p. when, therefore, I apply the above censured Position to the Pillar of the Cloud by Day, and the Pillar of Fire by Night, Sect. 59. it is yet,

yet, consistently, with what God says to *Moses, Exod. xxiii. 20, 21, 22.* for though in the two former of the three Verses, the Almighty doth not say, I will not pardon, &c. yet, in the last Verse, he, adds, ‘ but if thou shalt indeed obey his ‘ Voice, and do all that *I speak*, I will ‘ be an Enemy unto thine Enemies; and ‘ an Adversary unto thine Adversaries;’ where God’s, plainly assuming to speak in the first Person, clearly shews that he means, by what he himself speaks, the Words of the Voice uttered from amidst the Cloud, or the Fire; which therefore, as the visible Indications of his immediate Presence, are eminently, or figuratively, called his Angel. Neither can I see how it can be more a Contradiction, to say, that God, who is every where present, sends as an Angel, the significant Indications of his immediate Presence, than to say, that he sends an, actually-intelligent, Spirit, as his Angel; who because he is sent by God, unless in Cases plainly excepted by God himself, is therefore, notwithstanding, supposed to be, constantly, attended by some visible Marks, of his Name being in him, or, of his being in an extraordinary Manner present with him.

If the Author of *the Essay on Spirit*, pleads for any Worship, or Adoration to be paid to Angels, and admits that such Worship terminates in God, * he then plainly pleads for Divine Worship to be paid to Angels, which yet is only due to God; for if it is not divine Worship, it cannot terminate in God, who is the sole Object of our purest and most perfect Adoration, and what comes short of that is only debasing and dishonouring him. But he will say the Worship he pleads for is only in Proportion to the Authority, with which they are invested. But this Authority is plainly that of God; and therefore Worship, proportionable to that, must be the highest Worship due to God himself. But then he again will say he pleads not even for this, unless it is clearly reveal'd, that, they are deputed for this Purpose and authoris'd to receive it. When he shews us any such Revelation, we shall freely allow what he now, ineffectually, pleads for: But till then, I hope he will acknowledge, or the candid Reader for him, that I have not here misrepresented his Meaning.

* *Essay on Spirit*, Sect. 85.

As

As to the Self-Contradiction then, which he thinks he here fastens upon me ; I shall only give him this short Answer, that I have no where said, that the Occasional Marks of God's immediate Presence are to be worshipped ; and that there is a wide Difference between adoring the immediate Presence of God made known unto us in an extraordinary Manner, and adoring the visible Marks themselves ; though such Adoration should terminate, at last, in God himself.

But, to compleat the Candour of his Remarks, upon this Part of my Answer, he first takes it for granted, p. 189. that I entirely agree with him, as to his Notion of this Angel, and then, with wondrous Dexterity, claps his own Meaning, like a Juggler's Padlock, on my Words, which, while in that Situation, I own, must appear ridiculous enough. But seriously, in the Beginning of that Section, I declare myself thus, ' Now the equal Honour, which the Son here asserts, *would* be very different from that Obedience, which God is said to enjoin the *Israelites* to pay the Angel, *were it even allowed*, that such Obedience was required

‘ quired to be given to the *Angel only.*’
 Wherein it is plain, meerly for Argument Sake, I admit, what he advances, concerning this Angel, to be true : And then shew, though I allow him the utmost he desires, that, notwithstanding the Power, said to be given to this supposed Angel, is far short of the Power given to Christ ; and consequently that this Angel could not be Christ ; which yet, though the Power of his supposed Angel be stinted, doth by no Means stint, or confine, the Power of God.

Though therefore his Skill in framing imaginary Contradictions be now apparently very great, yet his ineffectual Application of them must, doubtless, disgust the Reader, whatever may be his own Reason for quitting so favourite a Task ; but let us now see the Force of his next Attack.

Upon my Distinction between the Unity of the Members of Christ’s Church and the Unity of Christ and his Father, he says, had this been the Meaning of our Saviour in the afore-cited Text, he would have said, ‘ that they may be one, altho’ not, as we are ‘ one.’ But why so ? Our Saviour makes a
 Com-

Comparison, which, from the Nature of such Allusions, doth never imply a total Identity in every Part, and therefore needed not that the same should be specified. And as I have shewn, in my short Note upon it, that the divine Union is unavoidably to be understood to be of a different Nature from the ecclesiastical, the former, being plainly intimated in Scripture, to be eternal, necessary and immediate, the latter temporary, arbitrary and mediate; So it is plain, that our Saviour's Sense could not be mistaken without Design. Though therefore the Comparison is made, without directly pointing out the Difference; yet every one of common Sense, who considers the Tenour of the Scriptures, must see that, as the One Union is plainly Spiritual, so the other must be understood to be strictly Essential; and neither of them Allegorical; which, was it allowed to be the usual Style of the Scriptures, would be, with the *Socinians*, to make them capable of as various Senses, as the vain Imaginations of Men would be apt to fix upon them.

If, as the Author of *the Essay on Spirit* asserts, the Son is not of the same Divine Nature

Nature with the Father, and Consequently different, and inferior, in every Respect ; any of the Glory, due to the Father, cannot be attributed to the Son ; the Father having declared, positively, and without Exception, that he will not give his Glory to another. None therefore of the Glory due to the Father, on Account of Man's Redemption, can be given to the Son. The Glory of the Son is, that only of a subordinate Minister, or Servant, every way Distinct, and of a different Nature from that of his Father, his Master and Employer. The Son then cannot be *High* in the *Glory* of the *Father*, because he partakes of none of that Glory. When therefore I say it is an unfair Argument, &c. p. 187. it is plain, that I only represent this Author, as denying the Son to partake, in his own Right, of any of the Glory, due to the Father, and not, that he denies any Sort of Glory to be due to the Son ; only as he first makes the Son incapable of any of his Father's Glory ; and then confounds the one with the other, when he owns the Son to be *High* in the *Glory* of *GOD* the *Father*, thereby evidently contradicting Himself.

But

But this Candid Remarker, again, asserts, that, from its being said, ‘ that all Judgment is committed to the Son by ‘ the Father,’ I unfairly and fallaciously infer, that the Son hath actually, in himself, the Great and only Obligation of all Duty. The Words of Scripture, which he himself refers to, though he hath not fully and fairly recited them in his *Essay*, are these †, ‘ For as the Father hath ‘ Life *in Himself*, so hath he given to ‘ the Son to have Life *In Himself* ;’ and (in the same Manner, which the Copulative, ‘ and,’ together with the expressive assimilating Particle, ‘ also,’ plainly implies) hath given Authority to him to execute Judgment also, because he is the Son of Man. Now, surely, if the Father hath given to the Son, Authority to execute Judgment (which, ver. 22. is expressed by committing all Judgment to him) in the same Manner, as he hath given to him to have Life *In Himself*, he hath then committed to him to have actually, all Power of Judgment *In Himself* ; and consequently, according to this Gentleman, the great and only Obligati-

† St. *John*, v. 26, 27.

on of all Duty. But perhaps he will say, to have a Power, in One's Self, of One's Self, is very different from having a Power, in One's Self, of another. With Regard to the Original Source of that Power we grant it is ; but with Regard to the actual Possession of it, it is the same, let it come from what Cause it will ; and consequently the Person, so possessed of it, is thereby, upon an equal footing with any other Person possessed of the same Power.

To say that the Divine Nature can, *Feelingly*, know what Allowances are to be made to Human Failings, cannot be strictly and literally true. But when I apply the same Expression to Christ, it is plain, that I do it in a strict and literal Sense, with Regard to Human Nature by him assumed : This Gentleman, therefore, to make out his Argument, must apply it literally also to God, contrary to all Sense and Reason. But besides this, had he attended to what I say immediately after the Words quoted by him, he could not with any Colour of Reason, have made his Construction. For there I plainly declare, or imply, that this was done not for any further Information to Christ, who,

who, as God, knew all this before ; but to induce Men to hope, that their Sincere, though imperfect, Endeavours, will be accepted by their Judge, whom they now, by this Method of Dispensation, calculated, in this Respect, meerly for their Sakes, know to be, experimentally touched with the feeling of our Infirmities, and in all Points tempted as we are, yet (on Account of the Divine Nature united to the Human, entirely) without Sin.

Though the Author of *the Essay on Spirit* is pleased, now, to call the Doctrines of the *Platonick* and *Pythagorean* Trinity a Rhapsody of Nonsense, yet it is plain he did not think so, when he wrote his *Essay* ; wherein he asserts, and endeavours to prove, the Coincidence of those Doctrines with his own favourite Notions of this Article, and, what he asserts, to be the genuine Opinion of the primitive Fathers of the Church ; and this plainly for a further Purpose than to shew, that the Stress, which some great Names laid upon those Doctrines, was of no Advantage to their Argument ; and therefore, what I say, p. 227. can by no Means be understood, as an Approbation or Acknowledgment, of his ha-
ving

ving done this; but in some Sort, accounting for the Medley of Truth and Falshood in the *Platonick* System. But as he entirely declines any further Remark upon this Part of our Work, I shall leave him to think what he pleases of my pretty, witty Sarcasm, as he calls it; and only say, that, as, by his pretended Coincidence he plainly adopts the *Pagan* Trinity, so his Uneasiness at the Imputation, but too clearly, shews that he, sensibly, understands and feels it's Force.

The Proof taken by this Gentleman, from the *Anathema* of the *Nicæne Creed*, for the Identity of *Ousia* and *Hypostasis*, we have shewn to be of no Force; nor hath he at all contested it. That which he refers to out of *Atbanasius* we have also shewn to have a quite different Tendency from what he represents it, which neither hath he thought fit to disprove. But to shew the consistent Ingenuity of this Author, I must here observe, that, in his Essay he quotes that Father's Words thus, *ἢ δι' ὑποστάσεως ὁσία ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁδὸν ἄλλο σημαίνοντα ἔχει.* As if the Period fully and compleatly ended there. And in a Pamphlet, styled, *Some Thoughts on Self-Love*, &c. he makes Mr. Knowles in his Answer (a
Piece

Piece which I have not seen,) produce the above Passage, with the Addition of, *ἡ αὐτὴ τοῦ ὁ* which is truly according to *Athanasius*, though not the End of the whole Period, and declares a School-boy ought to be whipt for the Interpretation which Mr. *Knowles* gives of it: Yet here, in this very Remark, he produces it in the same Manner, and gives it in Effect the same Sense, for which he before abused Mr. *Knowles*: For it is well known that, the Expression, *τὸ ὅ*, is apply'd by *Plato* to denote the Self-existent Being; and therefore to interpret it, 'that which is, or exists,' must be understood, to make the Sentence end here with any seeming Force, eminently in *Plato's* Sense, and so far justify Mr. *Knowles*. But besides that his Quotation in his Essay is short of, and different from, his Quotation here, and for which he but poorly apologizes in his Pamphlet, it is plain, to every one, who will be pleased to consult *Athanasius*, that the Sense, as he now quotes it, is still incomplete; that Father intending to shew according to the Prophet, whose Sense he is delivering, and not his own, as we have shewn before, a further Meaning of *Hypostasis*, than that of *Ousia*; and therefore adds

ἡ αὐτὴ

ἡ αὐτο τοῦ ὄν, ὅπερ Ἰερειμίας ὑπαρξίν ὀνομάζει λέγων,
 &c. that is, ‘but that very Thing itself,
 ‘or that very actual Thing, which else-
 ‘where, *Jeremiah* call *υπαρξίς*, saying,
 &c.’ agreeable to the Interpretation,
 which I have already given of this Pas-
 sage. Whereas did the Period end with,
 τὸ ὄν, and this was to be interpreted ac-
 cording to this Gentleman, ‘That which
 ‘is, or existeth,’ or, more properly, the
 Being; it would be, in truth, no more
 than a needless and insipid Tautology;
 the Meaning of *Ousia*, Essence, which
Hypostasis is already declared to be, fully
 and exactly expressing that Sense. Our
 Author’s Assertion therefore in his Essay
 Sect. 133. is entirely as ill-supported,
 as it was before; and *Albanasius*, clearly
 professing to give no general Definition
 of the Term, but only the Sense it bears
 in the Words of the Prophet according
 to the *Septuagint*, is still free from that
 Disingenuity, which this Gentleman is
 so liberal in charging him with.

But it seems, my Distinction upon his
 Application of the term Person, hath ex-
 cited him not only to exert the utmost
 Strength of his Reasoning, but also of
 his Wit. The Manner however, in
 which

which he displays the latter, brings, to my mind the notable Genius of *Bayes* in the Rehearsal, who had got an admirable Simile, the Application of which, however, was perfectly Arbitrary, and to be brought in, when he pleased, meerly for it's own Sake. This Gentleman seems to be equally happy here, and to have introduced a stale Story, that probably hath often stood him in the same stead, meerly, for the Sake of telling it; and perhaps at the same time to shew, that there are *Bayes* in Philosophy, as well as in Poetry. This however will not be disputed with him; though I shall not so easily admit the Force of his Reasoning, which comes next to be examined.

The Logical Definition of Analogy, as it is allowed to be chiefly applicable to mathematical Analogy, implies not only a known Similitude of Ratios, but also that those Ratios are equally capable of being precisely known or discovered. For mathematical Reasoning leading to *Demonstrative Certainty*, the Proportions must be strictly such to produce that Certainty. This we know to be contrary to the received opinion concerning the Methods,
sup-

supposed to be invented in that Science, of determining exactly the Proportions between finite Numbers and Quantities, and infinite. But the greatest Advocates for that profound Science must own that we have no direct and proper Ideas, or rather no Ideas at all of any truly infinite Number or Quantity ; and consequently, that when we attempt to conceive such, it is only by the Substitution of that which is actually finite for that which is infinite and therefore inconceivable, as their Processes in their infinite Series, their Logarithms and Fluxions plainly evince ; wherein, after their utmost Pains, they are obliged to stop, tho' confessedly they have not, nor ever can, arrive at the Exactness proposed. And yet these Methods are justly acknowledged satisfactory enough for the Purposes they are intended to answer, because human Reason therein seems to have made it's utmost Stretch, and all that it can do is only to find out more ready and concise Means to do as much and no more. If this then be the Case with Regard to Numbers and Quantities, we still must deviate much farther from this Logical Analogy, when we come to compare Things human with Things divine ; of which

which latter tho' we have no direct and proper Ideas, or, indeed, no Ideas at all as they are in themselves, or in their own Nature; yet from the various Ways by which God, otherwise unaccountably makes the Existence of the invisible Things of the other World known unto us, we are certain that they have as real and solid a Foundation as the visible Things of this World; and that, therefore, there is a real Similitude and Correspondency between them; tho' what that particular Similitude is we are utterly incapable of knowing.* When therefore we endeavour to conceive Things Divine, it is indeed by *Analogy*, though not a *logical Analogy*, which strictly and properly implies not only the Terms, but the Things compared by those Terms equally knowable to us; but by an *Analogy*, which, tho' the Terms on each Side are capable of being known, yet the Things designed by those Terms are only, on one Side, knowable to us. And as it leads us to

* For further Confirmation of what we here assert, see the Procedure, &c. of the Human Understanding, and the same Author's Divine Analogy, frequently referred to in our Essay.

the Knowledge of Divine Things, it is therefore called *Divine Analogy*, and may be described, *A Substitution*, of the *direct and proper Ideas* which we have of the *Things of this World*, to represent the *Things of the other World*, of which we have no Ideas at all as they are in themselves, or in their own Nature ; but of the Reality of whose Foundation we have otherwise as much Certainty, as we have of the *Things of this World* ; and therefore conclude a real Similitude and Correspondency between them, tho' what that particular Similitude is, we are utterly ignorant.

Having thus then explained the analogical Sense in which I distinguish the Word, Person, to be apply'd by our Reformers ; and, at the same Time, so far established the Reasonableness and Necessity of it, as the Compass of this short Vindication would permit, and the Attacks, which this Gentleman makes upon my Distinction, seem at present to require ; let us now examine the force of that mathematical Demonstration, which he thinks I have produced for the falshood of the *Athanasian Doctrine* of the Trinity.

That

That there is not, strictly, any logical Analogy between Finites and Infinites, hath been sufficiently shewn; and much less between human and divine Things. It will not therefore follow, by the Rule of logical Analogy, which requires, not only the Terms, but the Things compared by those Terms, equally knowable to us, that as three finite Persons cannot be one finite Person, so three infinite Persons cannot be one infinite Person; because we have no Idea at all of what is meant by the Term infinite Person, as it is in its own Nature; and between a Thing known and a Thing not known there can be no Proportion or Similitude assigned; upon which however the whole force of logical Analogy depends. But, by the Rule of Divine Analogy, the above reasoning is strong and good. For there is not only a Similitude between the Terms, as well, because the Term, on one Side, is the direct and proper Idea of a finite Person knowable to us, as that the same direct and proper Idea is, again, substituted to represent, on the other Side, an infinite Person, however, in its own Nature, unknowable to us; but also the
 real

real Foundation of each Person's Existence is equally certain and sure, from whence a real Correspondency arises, tho' what that, particularly, is, cannot at all be known unto us.

When again, it is asserted, that, ' the Father is God, the Son is God, and ' the Holy Ghost is God ;' to make the Distinction of three Gods as plain as the Distinction of three Persons ; which is absolutely necessary for the clear stating of this Question, and which however this Gentleman takes for granted ; it ought to be shewn that the Attribute of each Proposition hath as distinct a Sense and Meaning, as each Subject, but if they are as distinct Terms, each Proposition then is simply convertible ; and therefore it may be equally asserted, that God, in the full Extent and Comprehension of the Term, is the Person of the Father of the Son, and no more ; and that God, in the same manner, is the Person of the Son, and no more ; and that God again in the same manner, is the Person of the Holy Ghost, and no more. Each which converted Proposition, however, is manifestly false, the Extent of the Term,
God,

God, evidently containing in it more than the extent of the Term, the Person of the Father of the Son, and so on in each; for besides that it extends to what is meant by the Person of the Father of the Son, it further extends to denote the Creator and consequently the Father, in a different Sense, of all its Creatures; which the bare complex Term of, the Person of the Father of the Son, cannot, in any direct and immediate Sense, be extended to mean. The Prædicate therefore of each Proposition cannot be as distinct a Term, as each Subject: But then the Scriptures plainly declare, or strongly imply, the Father not only to be God, but the Son to be God, and the Holy Ghost to be God; and also as clearly give us to understand that there is but one God: The several simple Propositions then, into which this compounded one is reducible, being directly consonant to the former Declaration of Scripture, the whole compounded one must be equally understood to express the latter Declaration; and consequently the Prædicate of each simple Proposition but one and the same Term, both as to its Comprehension and Extent. So that the true and direct

meaning of the whole Proposition will then be, that the three Persons, Father, Son and holy Ghost, equally partaking incomprehensibly of one undivided Nature, are the one God; and therefore the proper State of the supposed analogical Question, with regard to this Proposition, is not whether three Gods can be any more one God, than three Men can be one Man; but whether these three divine Persons can be any more one God, than any three individual Men, or Persons, can be one individual Man, or Person; but this Question, as we have before shewn, is not determinable by this Gentleman's logical Analogy, and from the nature of divine Analogy it will appear to be no analogical Question at all. For though the Terms, on one Side of the supposed Analogy, are the direct and proper Ideas of Things knowable to us; yet the Terms, on the other Side, are not those same Ideas, substituted to represent things Incomprehensible to us, as they are in themselves. For the Term, Person, in its truly literal and proper Sense, means one individual Man, distinguished by certain peculiar Properties from all other Men, which yet plainly implies

implies a sameness of kind or Nature; and therefore may be analogically applied to represent particular spiritual Agents of the same Kind, or Nature, one with another; but the Term, God, is a Name appropriated by us to the divine Being, absolutely excluding a sameness of *Kind*, with itself, in any other Existence whatsoever; and consequently can admit of no analogical Word to help us to conceive, or to express it. It is absurd therefore to substitute, or analogically apply, the direct and proper Idea of, Person, to represent what is understood by the Term, God, which cannot be analogically conceived or expressed; and whose Signification, therefore, is otherwise, though unaccountably, conveyed to us. This Question then is not to be determined by the Rules of any sort of Analogy, but must solely depend upon the plain and evident Testimony of Scripture; which, that it declares these three Persons to be one God, either expressly, or by clear and natural Inference, I hope, I have sufficiently shewn; and that therefore it now appears, that this formidable *Tartar*, which this Gentleman thinks I have so unwittingly laid hold of, is but an airy

Phantom of his own Creation, that vanishes at once at the approach of substantial Truth and Reason.

Thus far then, I presume, my Application of the Term, Person, will appear clear of that puzzling and blundering which this Gentleman however genteelly charges it with; and what I further say with regard to his Assertion, that 'though the Relation between two coequal coeternal Beings might bear some Analogy to the Denomination of *Brothers*, yet it seems absolutely inconsistent with that of Father and Son,' will I believe be found as little liable to the same Imputation. For my Remark is intended only to shew that, there is the same Difficulty of conceiving the Coequality and Co-eternity of two divine Persons, by the analogical Application of two natural Brothers, as by that of a natural Father and a natural Son. For a Priority and Superiority being allowed at any rate, it matters not upon how little, or how great, a portion of Time, the Inequality depends. For admitting a difference of Time at all, the Inequality upon that Account, between any two Brothers born nearest in time

time to one another, is as great, as that between the eldest of the same *Brothers* and any other Brother, born at the greatest distance of Time that can possibly be supposed. But from the Application of ~~either~~ Case, by the Rules of logical Analogy, we see that no Consequence at all will follow; and yet, if we were authorized by Scripture to apply either Case, a plain and necessary Consequence would follow by the Rules of divine Analogy, to wit, that as two finite human Persons, who, upon account of the Circumstances of their Birth, are peculiarly and properly called *Brothers*, are yet, upon account of one being born in Time before the other, evidently, unequal; so two infinite divine Persons, though necessarily represented by the analogical Substitution of our direct and proper Ideas of two natural Brothers, are yet, from the very Terms, if they have any meaning at all, excluded from the Supposition of beginning to exist in time, and consequently co-equal and co-eternal: The Analogy here, plainly, implying no more than a bare Substitution of Ideas of Things, which we do know, to represent Things which we cannot possibly know, as they
are

are in themselves ; but between which, we are certain, there is a real Similitude, though what that is we are entirely ignorant ; upon which reality, however, the Foundation of the Analogy depends ; the nature of the Things compared, therefore, are by no means altered by the Substitution, but that, which, before the analogical Application, was, in itself, infinite and incomprehensible, must still for ever remain so.

Upon the whole, then, the candid and intelligent Reader is now to judge, whether what I here offer, be a sufficient Vindication of the Passages in my Essay, censured by this Gentleman ; and consequently whether what I have there urged be so far, a full Answer to the Doctrine asserted in the *Essay on Spirit*. The determination of this will shew upon which of us the untowardness of the Subject presses hardest. I should be sorry to be obliged to sit down suddenly again to write, as my Situation and Circumstances require a different Application of a good part of my time : but the Quickness and Agility of this Gentleman's Parts, and the singular Facility, with which he seems
to

to surmount the greatest Difficulties, give me, I own, some Apprehensions. But since it hath been my Lot to meet with so ready and expert an Adversary, I shall not now, therefore, betray, any unworthy Diffidence of that *All-Sufficient Being*, who hath hitherto so signally vouchsafed his Goodness to me. *He*, who out of the Mouths of Babes and Sucklings, hath perfected Praise, will, I doubt not, still support his infant Champion, and make the *Puny Shepherd's Staff* a Match for the *Huge Goliath's Beam* : To write upon so interesting a Subject, without a suitable warmth of Temper, to me seems an impossible Task. But Scurrility, I own, ought justly to render the Person, who flies for Refuge to it, unworthy of the Favour both of God and Man ; how far the Strength and just Severity of a Remark may affect a conscious Mind, they only, who feel it, can judge ; and in what light some Minds, irritated by the Pain thereof, may hastily represent such Strokes, I will not take upon me to say. But this I will venture to say, that Scurrility in any Shape was far from my Intention ; and that no one is more fully persuaded

fraded than myself, that the Use of it is,
and ever will be, injurious to the Cause of
Truth.

FINIS.

